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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
  ____________ 
 
No. 11-4360 
No. 12-1069 
____________ 
 
DAVID LEE MORRIS; PAMELA MORRIS, 
                                                                           Appellants 
 
v. 
 
RONALD KESSELRING; ROBERT KESSELRING; 
OFFICER ZUMBRUM; OFFICER JAMES ROWE, II;  
OFFICER GRIMM; OFFICER MOOREHEAD; 
RANDY WHITTEN; OFFICER HEDDINGER; 
ADAM FABRI; OFFICER SMITH; JOSHUA BRADY;  
SCOTT STRAUSBAUGH; MARK BARNEY 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 09-cv-01739) 
District Judge:  Honorable A. Richard Caputo 
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
February 14, 2013 
 
Before:  HARDIMAN and GARTH, Circuit Judges. 
and STARK
*
, District Judge 
 
(Filed: February 20, 2013) 
 
 
                                                 
     
*
  The Honorable Leonard P. Stark, District Judge for the District of Delaware sitting 
by designation. 
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____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 David and Pamela Morris appeal an order dismissing their civil rights action and 
an order awarding attorney‘s fees to two defendants.  We will affirm. 
I 
 We write for the parties, who are well acquainted with the case, so we review only 
briefly the essential facts and procedural history. 
The Morrises filed their initial complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on 
September 8, 2009, alleging that various law enforcement officers, municipalities, and 
private individuals violated their civil rights.  After the Morrises filed an amended 
complaint in February 2010, Defendants filed several motions to dismiss as well as a 
motion for a more definite statement pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e).  
A United States Magistrate Judge granted the Rule 12(e) motion after finding that the 
Morrises‘ amended complaint made ―sweeping statements and generalized allegations‖ 
that were ―devoid of particularized details as to time and date, person(s) involved, and 
other basic tenants [sic] of proper notice pleading.‖  Morris v. Kesserling,1 2010 WL 
4362630, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 27, 2010).  He ordered the Morrises to ―provide factual 
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 The caption in the District Court misspelled the last name of Defendant 
Kesselring. 
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information corresponding to the allegations of the amended complaint‖ in a new 
pleading, advised them to seek the assistance of additional counsel, and warned them that 
―[f]ailure to comply . . . may result in dismissal.‖  Id. at *2–3. 
Instead of following the Magistrate Judge‘s order, the Morrises filed an objection 
in which they asked District Court Judge Christopher Conner to strike the order on the 
ground that it was a personal attack on their counsel.  Judge Conner denied the objection 
and ordered the Morrises to file a second amended complaint.  The Morisses responded 
by filing a second amended complaint that was essentially identical to its predecessor.  
Several defendants then filed motions to dismiss the second amended complaint, 
including a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).  On May 
9, 2011, District Court Judge A. Richard Caputo
2
 granted the Rule 41(b) motion to 
dismiss because the Morrises and their counsel exhibited ―inexplicable truculence‖ in 
failing to abide by the orders of the Magistrate Judge and Judge Conner to properly 
amend their complaint.  Morris v. Kesserling, 2011 WL 1752828, at *1 (M.D. Pa. May 9, 
2011).  The District Court later denied the Morrises‘ motion for reconsideration. 
On May 23, 2011, Defendants Mark Barney and Scott Strausbaugh filed a motion 
for attorney‘s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, which the Court granted.  Morris v. 
Kesserling, 2011 WL 6130603, at *1, *3 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 2011).  The Morrises now 
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 Judge Conner had recused himself in March 2011 and the case was reassigned to 
Judge Caputo. 
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appeal the order denying their motion for reconsideration and the order granting 
$7,600.50 in attorney‘s fees. 
The unnecessarily prolix and disorganized nature of the Morrises‘ appellate brief 
and their second amended complaint makes it difficult to understand the facts underlying 
their claims.  The Morrises appear to allege that from summer 2007 through spring 2009, 
Ronald Kesselring conspired with his police officer brother, Robert Kesselring, and other 
law enforcement officers and private individuals to commit a series of actions against the 
Morrises that deprived them of their constitutional rights.  The Morrises later added 
constitutional claims against Strausbaugh and Barney alleging that they conspired with 
the other Defendants to retaliate against the Morrises for bringing the lawsuit.  The 
Morrises alleged that Strausbaugh and Barney threatened to have the Morrises arrested if 
they used Strausbaugh and Barney‘s private driveway.  Aside from these generalized 
allegations, little is understandable because the Morrises‘ appellate brief and second 
amended complaint are disorganized, rambling, and largely incoherent.  As a result, like 
the Magistrate and District Judges below, we ―cannot conclude with confidence what, 
exactly, is alleged.‖  Morris, 2010 WL 4362630, at *1. 
II
3
 
 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) provides, in relevant part, that ―[i]f the 
                                                 
3
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343, and we 
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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plaintiff fails to . . . comply with . . . a court order, a defendant may move to dismiss the 
action or any claim against it.‖  When determining whether to dismiss a case pursuant to 
Rule 41(b), we require a district court to balance the factors enumerated in Poulis v. State 
Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 747 F.2d 863, 868 (3d Cir. 1984).  Here, the District Court 
discussed each of the six Poulis factors at length, see Morris, 2011 WL 1752828, at *2–3, 
before it found ―dismissal of the suit to be more than justified,‖ id. at *3.  Despite the 
District Court‘s extensive analysis of the Poulis factors and its clear statement that the 
second amended complaint was dismissed under Rule 41(b), the Morrises‘ appellate brief 
fails to mention, let alone analyze, either Rule 41(b) or Poulis.  Instead, the Morrises 
suggest that the District Court dismissed the case pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6), a contention that has no support in the opinion under review. 
Normally, ―[w]e review a District Court‘s decision to dismiss a plaintiff‘s case 
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) for an abuse of discretion.‖  Briscoe v. 
Klaus, 538 F.3d 252, 257 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Emerson v. Thiel Coll., 296 F.3d 184, 190 
(3d Cir. 2002)).  However, ―[i]t is well settled that an appellant‘s failure to identify or 
argue an issue in his opening brief constitutes waiver of that issue on appeal.‖  United 
States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 222 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing In re Surrick, 338 F.3d 224, 
237 (3d Cir. 2003)).  Because the Morrises do not challenge the District Court‘s holding, 
they have waived any claim of error with respect to the District Court‘s dismissal of their 
case and its denial of their motion for reconsideration.  Accordingly, we will affirm the 
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District Court‘s decision to dismiss the case. 
III 
 The Morrises next argue that the District Court erred when it awarded $7,600.50 in 
attorney‘s fees to Strausbaugh and Barney because the Morrises‘ claims against these two 
Defendants were non-frivolous and the Court failed to hold an evidentiary hearing before 
awarding the sanctions.  We disagree. 
 A court may award attorney‘s fees to a prevailing party who succeeds in a § 1983 
action.  42 U.S.C. § 1988(b).  Because a dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(b) ―operates as an 
adjudication on the merits,‖ Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b), Strausbaugh and Barney are prevailing 
parties.  ―[A] prevailing defendant is entitled to attorney‘s fees only ‗upon a finding that 
the plaintiff‘s action was frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation . . . .‘‖  Barnes 
Found. v. Twp. of Lower Merion, 242 F.3d 151, 158 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting 
Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978)).  We review the award 
of attorney‘s fees for abuse of discretion.  Angelico v. Lehigh Valley Hosp., Inc., 184 F.3d 
268, 273 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 We hold that the District Court did not err when it found that the Morrises‘ 
claims—that Strausbaugh and Barney violated the Morrises‘ First and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights by blocking access to a private driveway—were frivolous.  We agree 
with the District Court‘s finding that the second amended complaint ―is bereft of any 
plausible allegations that these defendants were ‗state actors‘ for purposes of § 1983 or 
7 
 
that their blocking access to a private driveway defendants owned constituted civil rights 
violations.‖  See Morris, 2011 WL 6130603, at *3.  Therefore, the District Court did not 
abuse its discretion in granting attorney‘s fees to Strausbaugh and Barney. 
 Furthermore, though the United States Supreme Court has noted that ―attorney‘s 
fees . . . should not be assessed lightly or without fair notice and an opportunity for a 
hearing on the record,‖ Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 767 (1980), ―we 
have not interpreted . . . the Supreme Court to require an evidentiary hearing in every 
case,‖ Angelico, 184 F.3d at 279.  ―Rather, the concept of due process is flexible and 
whether a hearing is required depends upon the circumstances.‖  Id.  The Morrises had 
full notice of Strausbaugh and Barney‘s motion for attorney‘s fees and responded with 
their own opposing brief.  The actions of the Morrises and their counsel at issue were part 
of an extensive record that the District Court could properly consider without an 
evidentiary hearing.  Therefore, we find no abuse of discretion and we will affirm the 
order granting attorney‘s fees. 
IV 
 For the reasons stated, we will affirm the District Court‘s orders dismissing the 
second amended complaint and awarding attorney‘s fees to Defendants Strausbaugh and 
Barney. 
